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Corruption scandals seem to abound in countries that have recently undergone reform. Despite 
the proliferation of stories in the news media, no one has examined whether reform—be it 
democratization or economic liberalization or both—actually causes an increase in corruption. 
Theory provides no guidance as to the direction of causality—on the one hand, reforms make 
politicians accountable to voters, as well as introduce more competition, which should decrease 
corruption. On the other hand, the need for politicians to now raise campaign funds, as well as 
the increased availability of rents that results from economic liberalization provides for an 
incentive for corruption. This paper uses the numerous cases of democratizations and economic 
liberalizations that occurred in the 80s and 90s to examine this issue. The paper finds that 
undertaking both reforms in rapid succession actually leads to a decrease in corruption, while 
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1. Introduction 
If one goes by the news media alone, it would seem that every country that has 
undertaken political and economic reforms
1 is now suffering from rampant corruption. For 
instance, the New York Times has published 99 stories about corruption in Brazil since the 
country returned to democracy in 1985, with 86 of these coming after economic liberalization in 
1991. A broader search in LexisNexis yields more than 1000 stories during both time periods. 
The same is true for Mexico, which underwent political reform in 1994 following economic 
liberalization in 1986. Corruption also appears to be a major problem in the transition countries. 
Is it true, then, that corruption has actually worsened following reforms? It may appear 
obvious that such is not the case; that what we are observing is merely a result of a freer press 
that is more engaged in sniffing out corruption in their respective governments. But if this were 
the case, there would not be an awareness of increased corruption in China, which is undergoing 
economic but not political liberalization. Here it is not a freer press that is pursuing corruption, 
but the government itself, out of fear that it would bring down the Communist party.
2  
The question then is, has corruption in fact increased following these reforms? Figure 1 
suggests that this may be the case for some countries. Plotting the International Country Risk 
Guide (ICRG) corruption index for four countries,
3 it is seen that perceived corruption has 
actually increased in Brazil and Argentina (though it has decreased again in the latter), while it 
declined at first only to increase again in Poland and Hungary. Can it be concluded, then, that 
these reforms have only exacerbated the problem? Furthermore, Argentina and Brazil liberalized 
only several years after democratization, whereas Poland and Hungary undertook both reforms 
                                                 
1 I will be using the terms economic reform, economic liberalization, and trade liberalization interchangeably to 
mean broad trade liberalization. More details are given in Section 2. 
2 Elisabeth Rosenthal. “Details of Corruption Emerge in China.” The New York Times, 28 January 2001, pg4 col. 4. 
3 The ICRG index rates countries on a scale from 0 (most corrupt) to 6 (least corrupt). In the graph, the index is 
reversed so that high values denote more corruption.   3 
nearly simultaneously. Does the speed of reform then matter? This is the question that this paper 
seeks to answer.  
Several countries underwent political and economic reform during the 80s and 90s, which 
provides for a natural experiment to address this issue. Many studies have explored the causes 
and consequences of corruption,
4 but few have looked at the effects of reform on corruption. 
Graeff and Mehlkop (2003), for instance, examine whether improvements in economic freedom 
have the same effect on corruption regardless of whether a country is rich or poor. They find that 
though restrictions on capital markets is significant for both groups of countries, the legal 
structure has more impact on rich countries, whereas access to sound money is significant for 
poor countries.  To my knowledge, though, no study has directly examined the effect of different 
combinations of reform on corruption. The closest is Giavazzi and Tabellini (2004), who look at 
the relationship between economic and political liberalizations and their effects on growth, 
investment, inflation, budget surplus, institutional quality, and corruption. The authors find that 
in isolation, increased economic and political liberalization decrease corruption. When 
examining possible interactions, they find that the order in which they are enacted do not matter, 
but countries that undergo both types of liberalization do seem to have lower corruption than 
ones that only liberalize across one dimension. The effect of the second reform, however, is 
found to be insignificant.  
This paper differs in several important ways. Firstly, the focus here is solely on the 
relationship between the two dimensions of liberalization and corruption, rather than growth and 
other economic outcomes. Secondly, Giavazzi and Tabellini only compare countries that 
undertook one reform with those that underwent two. This paper, on the other hand, also 
distinguishes between countries that had already liberalized across one dimension and those that 
                                                 
4 See, for instance, Treisman (2000), Mocan (2004), and Tanzi (1998).   4 
had not. Furthermore, although they look at whether the order of reforms matters, they do not 
examine whether the speed of reforms is of significance; in other words, whether countries that 
undertook two reforms in quick succession ended up with higher corruption than those whose 
reforms are more spread apart. Countries that undergo both reforms in quick succession may be 
more vulnerable to corruption than countries that have long been democracies,
5 so that 
relationship is an important one to explore. Finally, I test the robustness of my results by 
excluding high-income countries from the sample, as well as introducing other determinants of 
corruption and changing the definition of democratizations. 
This question of whether reforms create new channels for corruption is an important one. 
Corruption is believed to adversely affect a country’s development potential by curbing growth, 
investments, and the provision of public services, as well as increasing inequality, so 
understanding its causes is important in designing more effective development strategies.
 6  
Many reasons have been introduced as to why some countries have higher levels of 
corruption. Among those has been whether a country is open, measured in most cases as the 
share of imports in GDP. The argument is that when domestic firms have to compete with 
foreign firms, the rents enjoyed by the domestic firms are reduced, thereby diminishing the 
incentive for corruption (see Ades and di Tella, 1999). Greater openness may reduce corruption, 
but the more corruption there is, the more rent-generating trade barriers there will be (Treisman, 
2000). The degree to which a country is open to trade, then, is clearly endogenous; however, 
whether or not a country is open to trade, as well as whether the country decides to liberalize or 
not, is less likely to depend on the perceived levels of corruption. 
                                                 
5 Treisman (2000) finds that the longer a country has been a democracy, the lower the perceived levels of corruption. 
6 See, for instance, Aidt (2003) and Jain (2001) for surveys.   5 
Another explanation that has been frequently presented concerns the country’s regime. 
Countries that are democratic have lower corruption levels than non-democratic ones, since free 
press, free speech, and protection of civil liberties allows for more transparency (see Treisman, 
2000), making corrupt politicians accountable to voters. However, as has been pointed out (see 
Rose-Ackerman, 2001, for instance), a democratic regime does not guarantee lower corruption, 
as the need to raise campaign funds for electoral competition may lead to abuses of power. There 
are, of course, other reasons why democracies do not necessarily have lower corruption. One 
possibility is that voters may have incomplete information about candidates and obtaining 
information is too costly. This is true especially in developing countries, where high rates of 
illiteracy and poor access to information make the population more likely to vote to keep a 
corrupt politician in power, especially if said politician or party has been in power long enough 
to have turned into a “brand name.”
7  
In what instances, then, would political and economic liberalization not lead to a decrease 
in corruption? For one thing, democratization entails the writing of new laws and a new 
constitution. This, along with whether or not those laws are enforced, may end up creating more 
opportunities for corruption. For example, in Brazil, the perception of corruption has increased 
since democratization in 1985, as new electoral rules have decreased the ability of the executive 
to build coalitions and assure loyalty in Congress (see Geddes & Netto, 1992). And though the 
press has reported extensively on corruption, punishment itself depends on congressional action. 
Because of uncertainty in the constitution as to what to do in such cases, and because of the 
ability of the president to buy congressional support, the threat of punishment is not entirely 
credible. One former president, José Sarney, who had served as a senator during the military 
dictatorship before assuming the presidency once democracy was restored, escaped punishment 
                                                 
7 See Kurer (2001) for other reasons.   6 
entirely for having sought to buy votes for a five-year presidential term, and has since returned to 
being a senator, even serving twice as president of the Senate.
8 Another former president, 
Fernando Collor de Mello, nearly managed to buy enough votes to escape impeachment for his 
own corrupt practices.
9 Currently, Brazil has been reeling from another major corruption scandal 
in which the ruling Workers’ Party, which was elected under promises to clean up government, 
is accused of having paid a monthly stipend of $12,500 to deputies from other parties in 
exchange for support.
10 This then suggests that in countries where the threat of punishment is not 
credible, corruption may actually flourish with the reforms.  
Economic liberalization in particular may create bountiful opportunities for corruption. 
Countries not only lower tariffs when they liberalize, but they also begin allowing former state-
owned companies to become privatized. This, of course, creates a new source of rents. 
Politicians wishing to maximize their chances of being reelected will have an incentive in such 
an environment to award contracts to firms that pay them bribes, which in turn can be used to 
finance their campaigns. The lower the threat of punishment, the greater the incentive will be for 
the politician to accept the bribes. The threat of punishment, in turn, will depend not only on how 
much information the voters have, but also on how easy it is to change the rules of the game 
and/or buy votes to remain in office.
11 It is clear, then, that reform does not guarantee better 
governance. 
                                                 
8 Sarney’s biography was taken from the Academia Brasileira de Letras website at http://www.academia.org.br/. 
9 Collor’s administration was involved in a scheme that facilitated public contracts and influenced government 
decisions in exchange for kickbacks and commissions, with some of this money being used to pay for maintenance 
of Collor’s house and expenses of his family (Geddes and Neto, 1992). 
10 Larry Rohter and Juan Forero. “Unending Graft is Threatening Latin America.” The New York Times, July 30, 
2005. 
11 Another former president of Brazil, Fernando Henrique Cardoso, whose administration was also rocked by 
corruption scandals, managed to secure a change in the 1988 constitution that dropped the one-term limit, thus 
allowing him to run for reelection (See http://www.freedomhouse.org/survey99/country/brazil.html).    7 
Now, many papers looking at corruption have emphasized bureaucratic rather than 
political corruption. This paper, however, is concerned with how reforms affect opportunities for 
corruption at all levels. This emphasis is consistent with the most recent Transparency 
International Global Corruption Barometer
12 (see Hodess and Wolkers, 2004), which finds that 
the general public around the world believe that political parties, followed by parliaments or 
legislatures, are the institutions most affected by corruption.  
One of the difficulties in modeling corruption, however, lies in how to distinguish 
between corruption and rent-seeking. The World Bank defines corruption as the misuse of public 
office for private gain. As Tanzi (1998) points out, corruption can take many forms, and may not 
necessarily involve the payment of bribes. And even if it does, it is difficult to distinguish 
between a gift and a bribe. This paper uses the International Country Risk Guide (ICRG) 
corruption index, which has been produced annually since 1982 by Political Risk Services, a 
private international investment risk service, as an indicator. This index, which measures 
corruption at all levels of government and bureaucracy, is based on the opinion of experts, and 
seeks to capture the extent to which “high government officials are likely to demand special 
payments” and “illegal payments are generally expected throughout low levels of government in 
the form of “bribes connected with import and export licenses, exchange controls, tax 
assessments, police protection, or loans.”
13 The sample consists of an unbalanced panel
14 of up to 
119 countries from 1984 to 2001, several of which underwent either one or both types of reforms 
during the sample period (see Table 1). This allows me to exploit both cross-country and time-
series variation in the data. 
                                                 
12 The Global Corruption Barometer is a public opinion survey assessing perceptions of corruption in 64 countries. 
13 http://www.icrgonline.com/page.aspx?page=icrgmethods 
14 It is an unbalanced panel because the ICRG index was not available for the entire period for some countries, and 
because some countries only came into existence later in the sample period.   8 
The results, described in section 4, suggest that undertaking both reforms in rapid 
succession actually leads to a decrease in corruption, while countries that democratized more 
than 5 years after liberalizing experienced an increase in corruption. These results are robust to 
correcting standard errors to account for possible serial correlation, reducing the sample to 
exclude high income countries, using a different criterion for denoting democratizations, and to 
including additional control variables. 
The paper is divided as follows. Section 2 provides a description of the data, while 
Section 3 presents the empirical specification. Section 4 examines the results and subjects them 




There exists no objective measure of corruption, so since Mauro (1995), a number of 
empirical studies have employed various subjective indices that attempt to measure the perceived 
levels of corruption in a country. One of these indices is the International Country Risk Guide 
(ICRG) corruption index. The ICRG index provides an appraisal of corruption within the 
political system. As mentioned in the introduction, the ICRG index is based on the opinion of 
experts. The aim is to provide potential investors with an assessment of the likelihood of a 
government overthrow or a breakdown in law and order.  
The index varies from 0 to 6, with higher values denoting less corruption. The data are 
provided on a monthly basis, so a simple annual average is used, thus making the index 
continuous between 0 and 6. For ease of interpretation, I reverse the index so that high values 
correspond to high corruption levels.    9 
One advantage of the ICRG index over other available indices is the fact that it is 
available for a long time period and for a large sample of countries. It is also highly correlated to 
other indices that have been used in the literature, such as Transparency International and 
Business International (see Treisman, 2000, for more details), which suggests that they are 
consistent despite being a subjective rating. However, as Ades and di Tella (1999) point out, 
some of the disadvantages of using such subjective indices include the fact that the rankings may 
not be uniform, so that a change from a score of 3 to 4 is different from a change from 5 to 6. 
Furthermore, it is difficult to say whether changes in score reflect changes in real levels of 
corruption, or the addition of new data or methodological differences. Finally, there have been 
arguments that such corruption perception indices are more a measure of institutional quality 
than actual corruption. Mocan (2004), for instance, uses the United Nation’s International Crime 
Victim Survey (ICVS) to construct a measure of actual corruption. After controlling for 
institutional quality, he finds that the extent of actual corruption does not have a significant effect 
on perceptions of corruption. The ICVS survey, however, only asks a sample of households 
whether “any government official asked or expected a bribe for services.”
15 The ICRG index, on 
the other hand, is more concerned with “actual or potential corruption in form of excessive 
patronage, nepotism, job reservations, favor-for-favors, secret party funding, and suspiciously 
close ties between politics and business,” in addition to financial corruption.
 16 Clearly the 
question asked by the ICVS survey does not address these forms of corruption. Furthermore, 
given that such indices are used by banks and multinationals in making investment decisions, 
they are important in predicting a country’s economic performance 
                                                 
15 http://www.unicri.it/icvs  
16 http://www.icrgonline.com/page.aspx?page=icrgmethods   10 
The sample of countries included in the analysis, shown in Table 1, are restricted to 
include only those for which I could obtain scores. They include countries that underwent no 
reform, one reform, or both reforms in the 1984-2001 period. More detail on how countries were 
assigned to different groups is provided below.  
 
2.2. Economic Reform 
The indicator for economic reform is constructed from the trade liberalization dates 
provided in Wacziarg and Welch (2003), who update the Sachs and Warner (1995) openness 
indicators and trade liberalization dates. The liberalization date is taken to be the date after which 
all of the Sachs and Warner openness criteria are continuously met. According to their criteria, a 
country is considered closed if one of the following conditions holds: 1. average tariffs exceed 40 
percent; 2. non-tariff barriers cover more than 40 percent of trade; 3. it has a socialist economic 
system; 4. the black market premium on the exchange rate exceeds 20 percent; 5. there is a state 
monopoly on major exports. If none of those conditions apply, the country is considered open. 
Countries that liberalize are assigned a 1 starting on the date indicated by Wacziarg and Welch, 
whereas those that never meet the criteria for openness are assigned a 0.  
Now, the Sachs and Warner index has been criticized by Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000) 
for being nearly completely determined by the last two conditions. They argued that using those 
two criteria alone generated a dummy variable that was different from the Sachs and Warner 
index in only 6 cases, whereas using the other three conditions generated a dummy that was 
different in 31 cases. Furthermore, they point out that the black market premium is more an 
index of macroeconomic imbalances than openness, while the state monopoly of exports variable 
is virtually indistinguishable from a Sub-Saharan Africa dummy. This criticism was leveled   11 
against both the openness index itself, as well as the liberalization dates. However, Wacziarg and 
Welch argue that their updated liberalization dates do in fact reflect broader liberalization, since 
policy changes that reduced the black market premium or eliminated state monopolies were also 
in most cases accompanied by a decrease in tariffs and non-tariff barriers. Furthermore, whereas 
the openness dummy is based on the five criteria listed above, the dates of liberalization were 
cross-checked against a broad survey of country case studies. In creating the reform indicator for 
this paper, then, I use the liberalization dates rather than the openness dummy.  
There are, of course, several alternative measures of openness. For instance, one could 
use a measure of imports as a percentage of GDP, which has often been employed in the 
literature, or even tariffs. These indicators, however, are not as broad a measure of liberalization 
as the Wacziarg and Welch openness dates. Furthermore, they do not provide a clear separation 
between open and closed countries. An alternative measure would be to use the Economic 
Freedom Index, which measures various aspects of economic liberalization. This index, 
however, is only available for every five years, so its use would substantially decrease the 
sample size. To ensure the validity of the liberalization dates used, though, I did compare them to 
the Economic Freedom Index, and found that they did correspond to periods of substantial 
improvements in economic freedom.  
 
2.3. Political Reform 
Political liberalization is defined here as a change from a non-democratic to a democratic 
regime. This means that I am considering only democratizations rather than improvements in 
regime.
17 Transitions are identified using the POLITY2 and the REGTRANS indicators in the 
                                                 
17 Most countries that democratized in the sample moved towards a full democracy. The average POLITY2 index 
for countries following democratization was 6.64.   12 
POLITY IV database, which is currently available up to 2003.
18 The variable POLITY2 is a 
modified version of POLITY, which codes transition years so as to detect changes in regime. 
The POLITY variable, for its part, is a measure of the quality of democratic institutions, and 
varies from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). The variable REGTRANS 
measures regime transition, with a “democratic transition” being defined as a three-point change 
in three years or less from autocracy to partial democracy (+1 to +6) or full democracy (+7 to 
+10). The variable assigns the same value for each year of the regime transition. A value of +3 is 
assigned for “major democratic transitions,” which is defined as an increase of at least 6 points 
over 3 or less years; while a value of +2 is given to “minor democratic transitions,” which are 
defined as a change of 3 to 5 points.
19 A regime change is then taken to be a change from a non-
positive to a positive POLITY2 value. Countries that have changed the regime are assigned a 1 
starting the year they become a democracy and 0 otherwise; all other countries that have not 
changed the regime are assigned a 0.  
As a further check on this definition of regime change, I use the Freedom House Freedom 
in the World country ratings. In particular, I use the overall status to define political 
liberalization as a shift from a “not free” or “partly free” status to “free.”
20 These ratings are 
generated by taking an average of a country’s political and civil rights rating. The political rights 
index ranks countries each year in seven categories, such as the existence of fair electoral laws, 
equal campaigning opportunities, and whether there is a significant opposition vote. The civil 
rights index ranks countries on various categories including freedom of expression, assembly, 
association, education, and religion. The index varies from 1 (free) to 7 (not free). Countries 
                                                 
18 See http://www.cidcm.umd.edu/inscr/polity/index.htm.  
19 Only 8 countries fell into this category. These were Albania (1997), Dominican Republic (1996), Ghana (1996), 
Guatemala (1996), Peru (1993), Paraguay (1992), Romania (1996), and South Africa (1992-94). 
20 See http://www.freedomhouse.org/ratings/index.htm.   13 
whose ratings average 1 to 2.5 are considered “free;” 3-5 “partly free;” and 5.5 to 7 are denoted 
“not free.” In some cases, countries switch from “free” to “partly free,” but a full reversal here is 
only defined as a movement from “free” or “partly free” to “not free.” 
 
3. Empirical Specification 
3.1. Methodology 
Countries that liberalized across one or both dimensions during the period of interest fall 
into six categories, as shown in Table 1: 
1.  Closed countries that liberalized only across the political dimension; 
2.  Countries that were already open and now democratized; 
3.  Autocratic countries that became open; 
4.  Democratic countries that now became open; 
5.  Countries that democratized first and liberalized second; 
6.  Countries that liberalized first and democratized second. 
In addition to countries that liberalized across one or both dimensions, the sample also 
includes countries that did not undergo any type of reform. This allows me to estimate the effects 
of the reforms using a difference-in-difference (DID) approach. In DID estimation, the 
outcome—in this case, the perceived level of corruption—is compared between two groups 
before and after a policy change—here political and economic liberalization. One group, denoted 
the “control,” consists of countries that have not undergone liberalization. The other group, the 
“treatment,” in turn includes the countries that have undertaken reform. If the two groups are 
very similar, so that we are comparing apples and apples rather than apples and zucchini, then 
any difference in outcome can be attributed to the causal effect of the treatment. This means that   14 
the effect of the reform on corruption is then estimated from the difference in outcomes for these 
two groups (Meyer, 1995). An advantage of DID is that it takes care of all unobserved 
exogenous factors that exist before and after reform, as well as unobserved endogenous factors 
for each country in the sample if they are fixed before and after the reform in question. 
Simply comparing countries that underwent reform with those that did not, however, is 
problematic. For example, the set of countries that reformed may have been structurally different 
in various ways, such as culture, institutional arrangements, or constitutional tradition. 
Furthermore, there could be general trends that affect all countries in a similar way. If these 
unobserved heterogeneities are not taken into account, they could bias the results. Based on 
previous empirical studies on the causes of corruption, it is plausible to assume that these omitted 
effects are fixed in nature, rather than the outcome of a random draw.
21 Because the 
unobservables may contain a cross-sectional as well as a temporal dimension, I include both 
country-specific and year-specific fixed effects in the estimated equation. This means that 
identification is obtained out of within group variation.  
The estimated equation is of the form  
CORRit = !0 + !1REFORMit +"i +#t + $it             (1) 
where 
  
CORRit is the ICRG corruption index for country i at time t; 
  
REFORMit is dummy equal 
to 1 in the years after the reform for “treated” countries and 0 elsewhere; 
  
!i captures the country-
level fixed effects, which are assumed constant over time; 
  
!t is the year-specific fixed effect, 
which is assumed constant across countries; and 
  
!it is the unobserved error term.
22 Because there 
                                                 
21 Some of the variables that have been used in cross-sectional studies of corruption include ethnolinguistic division, 
an indicator for colonial origin, an indicator for legal system origin, and an indicator for federalism. See Treisman 
(2000). 
22 Standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent unless otherwise specified. More detailed is provided in the next 
section.   15 
could also be factors that evolve over time in different ways across countries, I also experiment 
with including time-varying, country-specific determinants of corruption as a robustness check.  
The main coefficient of interest is 
  
!1, which measures the effect of the reforms on the 
levels of corruption.
23 To see this, define !C  as the change in corruption for the control group 
and !T  as the change in outcome in the treatment group. Then we have 
!C = "0 +#t ( )$ "0 ( ) = #t ,       and 
!C = "0 + "1 +#t ( )$ "0 ( ) = #t + "1 
The difference between these two differences is then: 
! = !T " !C = #t + $1 ( )"#t = $1 
Countries are defined as “treated” only if they underwent reform during the period under 
consideration. More specifically, “treated” countries are the ones that reformed in the period 
starting from one year following the start of the sample and ending three years before the end of 
the sample. This is to allow for the delay between a reform and its effect on perceptions of 
corruption. In a few cases, democratizations were reversed.
24 For instance, Albania first 
democratized in 1990, then underwent a period of reversal in 1996, only to revert back to a 
democracy in 1997. If a country remained democratic for at least 5 years before reverting back to 
an autocratic regime, that country was considered to have undergone reform, with the reform 
dummy being set to zero during the years of reversal.
25 Otherwise, the country was deemed 
autocratic throughout the entire period.
26  
                                                 
23 When control variables are added, !1is interpreted as the ceteris paribus effect of the reforms on corruption 
levels. 
24 Countries that democratized, only to revert back to autocracy, either briefly or until the end of the period, include 
Albania, Congo Republic, Haiti, Niger, Pakistan, Peru, Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.  
25 Givazzi and Tabellini (2004) defines their treatment group as either countries that underwent permanent reform (a 
reform that is uninterrupted and which is not reversed in the sample up to 2000); or countries that underwent at least 
a temporary reform that lasted for at least 4 years. To test the robustness of my results to the definition of reform, I   16 
3.2. Implementation  
Because reforms took place under different environments, various reform dummies 
reflecting the various groupings shown in Table 1 are created to identify their impact upon the 
level of corruption in a particular country. Firstly, “treated countries” include those that only 
liberalized (OPENONLY); those that only democratized (DEMONLY); and those that 
underwent both reforms, albeit in different order and at different speeds. In particular, 
DEM2LESS and DEMOPENLESS denotes countries that democratized first then liberalized 
within 5 years; OPEN2LESS and OPENLIBLESS refers to countries that liberalized first then 
democratized within 5 years; while DEM2MORE and DEMOPENMORE and OPEN2MORE 
and OPENDEMORE indicates countries that democratized first and liberalized second or 
liberalized first and democratized second, respectively, with the lag between those reforms 
lasting more than 5 years. 
The next step is to separate countries that underwent only one reform into the different 
environments under which those reforms were undertaken. In particular, CLODEMONLY refers 
to countries that are closed during the period and undergo democratization; AUTOPENONLY 
denotes countries that were autocratic and liberalized; OPENDEMONLY equals 1 after reform 
for countries that were already open during the sample period and democratized; and 
DEMOPENONLY refers to countries that were already democracies at the start of the sample 
period, and then liberalized. Countries that underwent both reforms are defined as above. 
 
                                                                                                                                                            
also experimented with excluding the countries that experienced reversal from the sample. The results, which are 
available from the author, are unchanged. 
26 The countries deemed autocratic were Sierra Leone, Uganda, and Zimbabwe.    17 
3.3. Identification 
With DID estimation, a crucial identifying assumption is that there is no unobserved 
variable affecting corruption that moves systematically over time in different ways between the 
groups of countries that underwent reform and those that did not (see Besley and Case, 2000). 
This means that the two groups of countries must be similar to each other, so that any omitted 
variable that varies across time, such as increased globalization, cannot affect the control and 
treated countries differently. In other words, we need to make sure that the only difference 
between the two groups of countries is the fact that one of them underwent reform and the other 
did not.  
Another factor that could cause the identifying assumption to be violated is if how 
countries are assigned to the treatment or control group is endogenous, so that the decision to 
reform is dependent on the level of corruption. It is not clear, however, that this would be the 
case, since the level of corruption is more likely to be a result of a country’s institutional 
environment, rather than a cause. Furthermore, the fact that the control group includes countries 
that are either always open and democratic or always closed and autocratic helps insure that the 
control and treatment countries are not much different on average. 
To address these issues, the robustness of the results is examined in various ways. Firstly, 
I always perform the analysis on both the full sample and on a sample where high income 
countries are excluded. High income countries are those that are classified as such by the OECD. 
Table 2 compares characteristics that have been used to explain corruption levels in the literature 
across countries that underwent democratizations, liberalizations, or both reforms, using the 
reduced sample. Tests of means reveal little statistical difference between control and treated   18 
countries. This means that removing high income countries from the sample does in fact make 
the two groups similar.
27 
Secondly, this paper follows Giavazzi and Tabellini (2004) by introducing a dummy for 
socialist legal origin interacted with the two reforms, so as to ensure that the estimated effect of 
the reforms do not reflect the circumstances of the transition in former socialist countries. As a 
robustness check, I also try including an interaction term between year fixed effects and time-
invariant indices classifying a country according to its region (Asia, Africa, Latin America), and 
socialist legal origin. This would make the different groups of countries more similar.  
Thirdly, as mentioned above, I experiment with changing the definition of treated 
countries by using the Freedom of the World index to create the democratization index. 
Furthermore, I add control variables that have been used in the literature to explain corruption 
levels. These variables are the size of the government, which is measured as the size of 
government, or total government expenditures as a fraction of GDP (IMF’s Financial Statistics), 
and the log of population (World Development Indicators); and the literacy rate for adults ages 
15 and above (World Development Indicators).
28 Ades and Wacziarg (1997) argue that large 
countries have smaller ratios of public service outlets per capita as a result of economies of scale 
in the provision of public services, so that individuals may resort to bribes in order to obtain 
service.
29 Knack and Ozfar (2000), on the other hand, find that this result that smaller countries 
are less corrupt is due to sample selection bias, as most of the available corruption perception 
indices include only small countries with good governance. When more countries are included in 
                                                 
27 Another reason for removing high income countries from the sample is, as Graeff and Mehlkop (2003) find, and 
as was previously mentioned, improvements in economic freedom affects corruption differently depending on 
whether the country is rich or poor. 
28 I also tried adding the log of GDP, the log of GDP per capita, and the Gastill index of civil liberties, but they were 
insignificant, and hence do not affect the results. 
29 Graeff and Mehlkop (2003), however, find that bigger governments are less corrupt.   19 
the sample, the relationship disappears. They also point out that due to the breadth of coverage, 
the ICRG index is less subject to this bias. As for the literacy rate, countries with high levels of 
illiteracy are predicted to be more corrupt, as people may not have much understanding of 
government process (see Rose-Ackerman, 1999). 
A final consideration regards the possible presence of positive serial correlation, which is 
common in DID estimation (see Bertrand et al., 2004). Positive serial correlation would not bias 
the estimated treatment effect, but it could cause standard errors to be understated. This is of 
particular concern in this case, as the corruption measure moves slowly over time. To correct this 
problem, I follow Bertrand et al., 2004, and also estimate the regressions allowing residuals to be 
correlated within each country. Another possibility, though, is that there is spatial correlation 
across countries of the same region that could be similarly affected by local shocks. To cope with 
this possibility, I further estimate regressions where the standard errors are calculated through 
clustering on region-year combinations. 
 
4. Results 
4.1. POLITY2 to Denote Democratizations 
Tables 3 and 4 display the results of the first set of regressions. In Table 3, reforming 
countries are distinguished between those that only democratized, those that only liberalized, and 
those that undertook both reforms (depending on order and number of years between each 
reform). Table 4 further distinguishes between closed and open countries that democratized, and 
democratic and autocratic countries that liberalized. In both tables, columns 1 through 6 include 
the full sample, whereas columns 7 through 8 exclude high income countries. In columns 1, 4, 
and 7, standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent; in columns 2, 5, and 8, standard errors   20 
are clustered on countries; and in columns 3, 6, and 9, standard errors are clustered by region-
year. Finally, only country-specific (time-invariant) and year-specific (country-invariant) fixed 
effects, as well as a socialist dummy interacted with each of the reforms is included in columns 1 
through 3 and 7 through 8. In columns 4 through 6, I also add regional dummies. 
In Table 3, undertaking both reforms in rapid succession decreases corruption while 
taking more than 5 years between one reform and the next seems to increase corruption. In 
particular, it is the second reform that has the most significant impact on corruption. Liberalizing 
less than five years after democratization further reduces corruption perception by about 0.4, for 
a total effect of about 0.6 reduction after both reforms. Countries that only undergo 
democratization also seem to have experienced a decrease in corruption of a lesser magnitude, 
though the effect is not significant if high income countries are excluded from the sample. In the 
meantime, democratizing no more than five years after liberalization decreases corruption by 
between 0.6 and 0.7. The effect of the first reform, however, is insignificant. Note that the effect 
of only liberalizing is also insignificant. 
Similar results for the first reform are obtained when examining those that took more 
time between one reform and the next. In particular, countries that first democratize saw a 
decrease in corruption, while the effect of liberalizing first is insignificant. The effect of the 
second reform, however, is highly significant, but completely the opposite of countries that 
undertook both reforms in rapid succession. In particular, corruption seemed to have increased 
by about 0.6 following liberalization in countries that had democratized more than 5 years 
before, and increased by 1 point in countries that democratized more than 5 years after having 
liberalized. These results are consistent with the experience of both Brazil (democratization   21 
followed 6 years later by liberalization) and Mexico (liberalization followed 8 years later by 
democratization), which were mentioned in the introduction. 
Distinguishing how countries that only undertook one reform started out in Table 4 does 
not alter these conclusions. Undertaking a second reform more than 5 years after the first reform 
increases corruption, while reforms in rapid succession decrease corruption. A further result is 
that closed countries that democratize experience a decrease in corruption, while the effect of 
undertaking only one reform in all other cases is mostly insignificant. 
In sum, then, it does not appear that rapid reforms increase corruption; in fact, it seems to 
be quite the opposite. Democratizing or liberalizing more than 5 years after the first reform may 
increase corruption, while undergoing both reforms within 5 years will decrease it.  
 
4.2. Freedom House Status to Denote Democratizations 
To further check the robustness of the results, I experimented on using a different 
criterion for determining whether a country underwent democratization or not. In particular, I 
used the Freedom House index, which denotes countries as being “Free,” “Partially Free,” or 
“Not Free.” For the purposes of this exercise, democratization is defined as a movement from 
“Partly Free” or “Not Free” to “Free.”  
Tables 5 and 6, then, present the results of the same regressions as Tables 3 and 4, only 
this time using the Freedom House definition. Table 5, like Table 3, looks at countries that 
undertook one reform without distinguishing how those countries started out; while in Table 6 
the distinction is made between closed and open countries that democratized, and democratic and 
autocratic countries that liberalized. As before, columns 1 through 6 in both cases include the full 
sample, whereas columns 7 through 8 exclude high income countries. In columns 1, 4, and 7,   22 
standard errors are heteroskedasticity-consistent; in columns 2, 5, and 8, standard errors are 
clustered on countries; and in columns 3, 6, and 9, standard errors are clustered by region-year. 
Finally, only country-specific (time-invariant) and year-specific (country-invariant) fixed effects, 
as well as a socialist dummy interacted with each of the reforms is included in columns 1 
through 3 and 7 through 8. In columns 4 through 6, I also add regional dummies. 
Again, undergoing both reforms in rapid succession decrease corruption. In both cases, 
liberalizing less than 5 years after democratization further lowers corruption by about 0.1, for a 
total effect ranging from 0.2 to 0.4, though the effect of the first reform is insignificant when 
high income countries are excluded. Democratizing less than 5 years after liberalization further 
reduces corruption by about 0.3, for a total reduction of around 0.6, which is similar to what was 
found when using the POLITY2 index to create the democratization index. Undergoing only one 
reform, though, is now mostly insignificant. 
As for reforms that are more than 5 years apart, liberalization followed by 
democratization is still found to increase corruption, only now the second reform only further 
raises corruption. In particular, the first reform increases corruption by 0.4-0.5, while the second 
one further increases it by 1, for a total effect of about 1.5. On the other hand, liberalizing more 
than 5 years after democratizing appears to now reduce corruption, though the effect is 
insignificant when regional dummies are added.  
 
4.3. Adding Control Variables 
Tables 7 through 10 add three control variables that have been previously used in the 
literature to explain corruption perception levels, namely, the size of government, the literacy 
rate, and the log of population. The effect of the size of government and the log of population are   23 
predicted to be ambiguous, while countries with higher literacy rates are expected to exhibit 
lower corruption perception levels. 
Each column is defined as before. In Tables 7 and 8, the POLITY2 index is used to 
generate the democratization dummies, while in Tables 9 and 10, the Freedom House index is 
employed. Tables 7 and 9 do not distinguish how countries that underwent only one reform 
started out, whereas that distinction is made in Tables 8 and 10. 
Once again, the results in all cases indicate that countries that liberalize first and 
democratize more than 5 years later experienced an increase in corruption following the second 
reform, an effect that was larger in magnitude than the initial decrease in corruption following 
the first reform. The effect of the second reform is insignificant, however, in Table 10 when high 
income countries are excluded. On the other hand, in both Tables 9 and 10, where the Freedom 
House index is used to denote democratization, the effect of the first reform is also to raise 
corruption, so it can be concluded that the overall effect of democratizing more than 5 years after 
a liberalization is to increase the perception of corruption.  
Democratizing first is again found to decrease corruption, both after the first and second 
reform, regardless of how far apart the two reforms are, although the effect of speedier reforms is 
not as robust throughout all specifications. Democratizing less than 5 years after liberalization 
also reduces corruption, though only following the second reform, as the coefficient on the 
liberalization dummy is insignificant across all specifications.  
As for countries that underwent only one reform, democratizations reduce corruption, and 
in particular when the country is closed. For those countries, corruption is reduced by 0.4 to 0.6 
points. Countries that only liberalize, however, seem to experience an increase in corruption,   24 
regardless of whether they start out as democracies or autocracies, although the effect is not 
significant when the definition of democratization is based on the Freedom House Index. 
Finally, the results indicate that bigger governments do in fact have less corruption, 
though it becomes insignificant when high income countries are excluded from the sample. 
Countries with higher literacy rates experience less corruption, as predicted, though it is not 
significant throughout all specifications. Furtherrnore, larger countries, as measured by the log of 
population, do appear to have more corruption, though again, the effect is not strongly 
significant. 
Overall, these results confirm the previous findings that democratizations are corruption-
reducing, while liberalizations can increase corruption, especially if liberalization is followed 
more than 5 years later by democratization. 
 
5. Conclusion 
Corruption scandals seem to abound in countries that have recently undergone reform. 
Despite the proliferation of stories in the news media, no one has examined whether reform—be 
it democratization or economic liberalization or both—actually causes an increase in corruption. 
Theory provides no guidance as to the direction of causality—on the one hand, reforms make 
politicians accountable to voters, as well as introduce more competition, which should decrease 
corruption. On the other hand, the need for politicians to now raise campaign funds, as well as 
the increased availability of rents that results from economic liberalization provides for an 
incentive for corruption. This paper uses the numerous cases of democratizations and economic 
liberalizations that occurred in the 80s and 90s as a natural experiment for examining this issue.    25 
The ICRG corruption index is used as the measure of the perceived level of corruption to 
construct an unbalanced panel of 119 countries over the 1984-2001, which allows me to exploit 
both cross-country and time-series variation in the data. I find that while democratizations reduce 
corruption, liberalization may potentially increase it. Furthermore, undertaking both reforms in 
rapid succession actually leads to a decrease in corruption, while countries that democratized 
more than 5 years after liberalizing experienced an increase in corruption. These results are 
robust to correcting standard errors to account for possible serial correlation, reducing the sample 
to exclude high-income countries, using a different criterion for denoting democratizations, and 
to including additional control variables. 
These findings, then, support the view that liberalizations may increase the incentives to 
abuse power, and in particular, that democratizing only many years after a liberalization can 
increase corruption. In other words, how far apart the two reforms are can have different effects 
on corruption. Many authors have argued that autocratic regimes are better able to introduce 
trade liberalization, since they will not be voted out of office because the reform is not benefiting 
the majority of the electorate at first. Giavazzi and Tabellini (2004), for instance, find that 
countries that liberalize first have better economic performance than those that reform in the 
reverse order. On the other hand, de Haan and Sturm (2003), using a sample of developing 
countries, find that democracy does not adversely affect liberalization. These studies, however, 
have not considered whether how far apart the two reforms are matter. This paper suggests that 
democratization is an integral part of reform, so that if a country waits too long to become 
democratic, it may end up with higher levels of corruption, which in turn could undermine its 
efforts to develop.   26 
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 Table 1: Countries and Years of Economic and/or Political Liberalization 
Group 1: Closed countries that Democratized  Group 2: Open Countries that Democratized 
Country  Year of Reform  Country  Year of Reform 
Iran  1997 (never)  Chile  1989 (1990) 
Malawi  1994 (1993)  Korea  1987 
Pakistan  1988* (never)  Thailand  1984* (1991) 
    Taiwan  1992 (1996) 
 
Group 3: Autocratic countries that Liberalized  Group 4: Democratic Countries that Liberalized 
Country  Year of Reform  Country  Year of Reform 
Burkina Faso  1998  Argentina  1991 
Cote d'Ivoire  1994  Bolivia  1985 
Cameroon  1993  Colombia  1986 
Egypt  1995  Costa Rica  1986 
Guinea  1986  Dominican Republic  1992 
Kenya  1993  Ecuador  1991 
Tanzania  1989  El Salvador  1989 
Tunisia  1995  Honduras  1991 
Uganda  1988  Israel  1985 
    Jamaica  1989 
    New Zealand  1986 
    South Africa  1991 
    Sri Lanka  1991 
    Trinidad  1992 
    Turkey  1989 
    Venezuela  1996 
 
Group 5: Democratized First, Liberalized Second 
Country  Year 1
st Reform  Year 2
nd Reform 
Albania  1990* (never)  1992 
Bangladesh  1991 (never)  1996 
Bulgaria  1990 (1991)  1991 
Brazil  1985  1991 
Ethiopia  1993 (never)  1996 
Guatemala  1986 (never)  1988 
Hungary  1989 (1990)  1990 
Madagascar  1991 (never)  1996 
Mozambique  1994 (never)  1995 
Niger  1991* (never)  1994 
Nicaragua  1990 (never)  1991 
Panama  1989 (1994)  1996 
Philippines  1986 (1987)  1988 
Poland  1989 (1990)  1990 
Romania  1990 (1996)  1992 
Uruguay  1985  1990 
Zambia  1991 (never)  1993   29 
Group 6: Liberalized First, Democratized Second 
Country  Year 1
st Reform  Year 2
nd Reform 
Ghana  1985  1996 (2000) 
Guinea-Bissau  1987  1991 (1989) 
Guyana  1988  1992 (1993) 
Mexico  1986  1994 (2000) 
Mali  1988  1992 (1992) 
Peru  1991  1993* (1984) 
 
 
Group 7: Countries that were Always Open and Democratic or Always Closed and Autocratic 
Algeria  Gambia  Norway 
Angola  Germany  Papua New Guinea 
Armenia  Greece  Paraguay 
Australia  Haiti  Portugal 
Austria  India  Russia 
Azerbaijan  Indonesia  Senegal 
Belarus  Iraq  Sierra Leone 
Belgium  Ireland  Singapore 
Botswana  Italy  Slovak Republic 
Canada  Japan  Slovenia 
China  Jordan  Somalia 
Congo Dem. Rep.  Kazakhstan  Spain 
Congo Rep.  Latvia  Sweden 
Croatia  Liberia  Switzerland 
Cyprus  Lithuania  Syria 
Czech Republic  Malaysia  Togo 
Denmark  Moldova  Ukraine 
Estonia  Morocco  United Kingdom 
Finland  Myanmar  United States 
France  Netherlands  Yemen 
Gabon  Nigeria  Zimbabwe 
Note: Table lists years of trade liberalization and democratization only if reforms fell during period under 
consideration (1984-2001). Dates in parenthesis indicate date in which country was considered Free under the 
Freedom House index, if the year is different from the Polity II index. * denotes whether reform was reversed. 
According to the Polity II definition, democratization was reversed in Albania, Peru, and Thailand for one year, and 
in Niger and Pakistan for 3 years.   30 
Table 2: Characteristics of Control and Treatment Countries 
  Liberalization only  Democratization only  Both reforms 
  Control  Treatment  Difference  Control  Treatment  Difference  Control  Treatment  Difference 
Corruption  3.379  3.056  0.322  3.246  3.115  0.131  3.233  3.107  0.126 
  (1.093)  (1.055)  (0.028)  (1.050)  (1.134)  (0.059)  (1.040)  (1.180)  (0.065) 
Obs. 
 
653  843    940  556    1066  430   
Real GDP   3.898  3.793  0.104  3.834  3.835  -0.0001  3.935  3.605  0.329 
Per Capita  (3.172)  (2.678)  (0.170)  (2.744)  (3.083)  (0.169)  (2.931)  (2.754)  (0.170) 
Obs. 
 
506  781    781  506    896  391   
Literacy  66.921  72.531  -5.610  71.460  68.768  2.692  70.629  69.919  0.710 
  (21.525)  (23.412)  (1.335)  (20.109)  (26.588)  (1.449)  (20.597)  (27.474)  (1.624) 
Obs. 
 
446  737    724  459    828  355   
Size of   0.238  0.247  -0.009  0.236  0.254  -0.018  0.231  0.273  -0.042 
Government  (0.087)  (0.122)  (0.007)  (0.088)  (0.134)  (0.008)  (0.085)  (0.147)  (0.009) 
Obs. 
 
380  560    559  381    655  285   
Political   4.809  3.707  1.102  4.366  3.883  0.483  4.353  3.774  0.579 
Rights  (1.879)  (1.870)  (0.098)  (2.023)  (1.785)  (0.100)  (1.992)  (1.784)  (0.105) 
Obs. 
 
649  843    936  556    1062  430   
Civil Liberties  4.847  3.919  0.928  4.461  4.090  0.372  4.453  4.002  0.451 
  (1.524)  (1.414)  (0.077)  (1.547)  (1.482)  (0.081)  (1.550)  (1.444)  (0.084) 
Obs. 
 
649  843    936  556    1062  430   
Fuel Exports  20.992  12.826  8.166  22.071  5.186  16.885  20.287  4.933  15.354 
  (32.195)  (19.851)  (1.857)  (29.006)  (11.921)  (1.324)  (28.637)  (7.900)  (1.182) 
Obs.  370  607    621  356    699  278   
Note: Control and Treatment columns present the mean of each variable for the reforms indicated (for instance, in the case of 
Liberalization Only, the control countries are those that did not liberalize, whereas the treatment sample includes countries that 
did). The column labeled Difference presents the differences of means. Standard deviations are in parenthesis. Corruption is the 
ICRG corruption perception index, which varies from 0 (least corrupt) to 6 (most corrupt). Real GDP per capita is expressed in 
1000s, and is taken from the Summers and Heston Penn World Tables. Literacy is the literacy rate for adults (ages 15 and above), 
from the World Development Indicators. The Size of Government is general government final consumption expenditure as a 
percentage of GDP, taken from the IMF’s Financial Statistics. The political rights index ranks countries each year in seven 
categories, such as the existence of fair electoral laws, equal campaigning opportunities, and whether there is a significant 
opposition vote. The civil rights index ranks countries on various categories including freedom of expression, assembly, 
association, education, and religion. The index varies from 1 (free) to 7 (not free). Fuel exports is the share of fuel exports in 
merchandise exports, from the World Development Indicators. 
 Table 3: Effects of Rapid Economic and Political Liberalizations on Corruption 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
OPENONLY  -0.065  -0.065  -0.065  -0.065  -0.065  -0.065  0.010  0.010  0.010 
  (0.072)  (0.156)  (0.097)  (0.072)  (0.156)  (0.097)  (0.078)  (0.173)  (0.104) 
DEMONLY  -0.250**  -0.250  -0.250**  -0.250**  -0.250  -0.250**  -0.083  -0.083  -0.083 
  (0.119)  (0.266)  (0.104)  (0.119)  (0.266)  (0.104)  (0.114)  (0.275)  (0.088) 
DEM2LESS  -0.210**  -0.210  -0.210**  -0.210**  -0.210  -0.210**  -0.277***  -0.277  -0.277*** 
  (0.101)  (0.194)  (0.089)  (0.101)  (0.194)  (0.089)  (0.093)  (0.185)  (0.080) 
OPEN2LESS  -0.031  -0.031  -0.031  -0.031  -0.031  -0.031  -0.059  -0.059  -0.059 
  (0.137)  (0.212)  (0.116)  (0.137)  (0.212)  (0.116)  (0.136)  (0.214)  (0.118) 
DEMOPENLESS  -0.433***  -0.433*  -0.433***  -0.433***  -0.433*  -0.433***  -0.373***  -0.373*  -0.373*** 
  (0.116)  (0.254)  (0.126)  (0.116)  (0.254)  (0.126)  (0.101)  (0.215)  (0.111) 
OPENDEMLESS  -0.684***  -0.684**  -0.684***  -0.684***  -0.684**  -0.684***  -0.603***  -0.603*  -0.603*** 
  (0.133)  (0.343)  (0.125)  (0.133)  (0.343)  (0.125)  (0.133)  (0.347)  (0.127) 
DEM2MORE  -0.402*  -0.402  -0.402*  -0.402*  -0.402  -0.402*  -0.437*  -0.437  -0.437* 
  (0.210)  (0.271)  (0.228)  (0.210)  (0.271)  (0.228)  (0.223)  (0.281)  (0.235) 
OPEN2MORE  -0.006  -0.006  -0.006  -0.006  -0.006  -0.006  -0.058  -0.058  -0.058 
  (0.211)  (0.294)  (0.191)  (0.211)  (0.294)  (0.191)  (0.205)  (0.281)  (0.188) 
DEMOPENMORE  0.603***  0.603*  0.603***  0.603***  0.603*  0.603***  0.573***  0.573*  0.573*** 
  (0.140)  (0.308)  (0.162)  (0.140)  (0.308)  (0.162)  (0.140)  (0.310)  (0.165) 
OPENDEMORE  1.052***  1.052**  1.052***  1.052***  1.052**  1.052***  1.002***  1.002**  1.002*** 
  (0.226)  (0.410)  (0.215)  (0.226)  (0.410)  (0.215)  (0.220)  (0.401)  (0.211) 
Sample  All  All  All  All  All  All  No High Inc  No High Inc  No High Inc 
Regional Dummies?  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Observations  1944  1944  1944  1944  1944  1944  1496  1496  1496 
Adj. R-Squared  0.7845  0.7845  0.7845  0.7845  0.7845  0.7845  0.6333  0.6333  0.6333 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. In columns 2, 5 and 8, standard errors are also clustered by country; in columns 3, 6 and 9, standard errors are 
clustered by region-year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and time fixed effects, as well as a socialist origin 
dummy interacted with each of the reforms (openness and democratization). Regional dummies refer to the interaction between the year fixed effects and dummy variables for 
Asia, Africa, Latin America, and socialist legal origin. No High Inc refers to sample excluding high income countries (per OECD definition). Reform dummies are defined as 
follows: DEMONLY (OPENONLY)=1 after democratization (liberalization) for countries that only democratized (liberalized); DEM2LESS (OPEN2LESS)=1 after 
democratization (liberalization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within 5 years; DEMOPENLESS 
(OPENDEMLESS)=1 after liberalization (democratization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within 5 years; 
DEM2MORE (OPEN2MORE)=1 after democratization (liberalization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within more 
than 5 years; DEMOPENMORE (OPENDEMORE)=1 after liberalization (democratization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) 
second and within more than 5 years.  
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Table 4: Effects of Rapid Economic and Political Liberalizations on Corruption, Distinguishing How Country Starts Out 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
CLODEMONLY  -0.402**  -0.402  -0.402***  -0.402**  -0.402  -0.402***  -0.332**  -0.332  -0.332** 
  (0.166)  (0.390)  (0.149)  (0.166)  (0.390)  (0.149)  (0.160)  (0.388)  (0.138) 
AUTOPENONLY  0.047  0.047  0.047  0.047  0.047  0.047  0.147  0.147  0.147 
  (0.113)  (0.212)  (0.187)  (0.113)  (0.212)  (0.187)  (0.118)  (0.227)  (0.200) 
OPENDEMONLY  -0.082  -0.082  -0.082  -0.082  -0.082  -0.082  0.250*  0.250  0.250* 
  (0.164)  (0.327)  (0.159)  (0.164)  (0.327)  (0.159)  (0.130)  (0.271)  (0.131) 
DEMOPENONLY  -0.134  -0.134  -0.134  -0.134  -0.134  -0.134  -0.075  -0.075  -0.075 
  (0.083)  (0.195)  (0.088)  (0.083)  (0.195)  (0.088)  (0.088)  (0.213)  (0.078) 
DEM2LESS  -0.211**  -0.211  -0.211**  -0.211**  -0.211  -0.211**  -0.278***  -0.278  -0.278*** 
  (0.101)  (0.195)  (0.090)  (0.101)  (0.195)  (0.090)  (0.093)  (0.185)  (0.080) 
OPEN2LESS  -0.032  -0.032  -0.032  -0.032  -0.032  -0.032  -0.060  -0.060  -0.060 
  (0.137)  (0.213)  (0.115)  (0.137)  (0.213)  (0.115)  (0.136)  (0.214)  (0.116) 
DEMOPENLESS  -0.431***  -0.431*  -0.431***  -0.431***  -0.431*  -0.431***  -0.368***  -0.368*  -0.368*** 
  (0.116)  (0.254)  (0.126)  (0.116)  (0.254)  (0.126)  (0.101)  (0.216)  (0.110) 
OPENDEMLESS  -0.682***  -0.682**  -0.682***  -0.682***  -0.682**  -0.682***  -0.598***  -0.598*  -0.598*** 
  (0.133)  (0.343)  (0.125)  (0.133)  (0.343)  (0.125)  (0.133)  (0.347)  (0.126) 
DEM2MORE  -0.402*  -0.402  -0.402*  -0.402*  -0.402  -0.402*  -0.437*  -0.437  -0.437* 
  (0.210)  (0.271)  (0.228)  (0.210)  (0.271)  (0.228)  (0.223)  (0.281)  (0.235) 
OPEN2MORE  -0.007  -0.007  -0.007  -0.007  -0.007  -0.007  -0.061  -0.061  -0.061 
  (0.211)  (0.294)  (0.191)  (0.211)  (0.294)  (0.191)  (0.205)  (0.281)  (0.187) 
DEMOPENMORE  0.602***  0.602*  0.602***  0.602***  0.602*  0.602***  0.571***  0.571*  0.571*** 
  (0.140)  (0.308)  (0.162)  (0.140)  (0.308)  (0.162)  (0.140)  (0.311)  (0.165) 
OPENDEMORE  1.051***  1.051**  1.051***  1.051***  1.051**  1.051***  1.002***  1.002**  1.002*** 
  (0.226)  (0.409)  (0.215)  (0.226)  (0.409)  (0.215)  (0.220)  (0.400)  (0.210) 
Sample  All  All  All  All  All  All  No High Inc  No High Inc  No High Inc 
Regional dummies?  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Observations  1944  1944  1944  1944  1944  1944  1496  1496  1496 
Adj. R-Squared  0.7847  0.7847  0.7847  0.7847  0.7847  0.7847  0.6349  0.6349  0.6349 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. In columns 2, 5 and 8, standard errors are also clustered by country; in columns 3, 6 and 9, standard errors are 
clustered by region-year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and time fixed effects, as well as a socialist origin 
dummy interacted with each of the reforms (openness and democratization). Regional dummies refer to the interaction between the year fixed effects and dummy variables for 
Asia, Africa, Latin America, and socialist legal origin. No High Inc refers to sample excluding high income countries (per OECD definition).  Reform dummies are defined as 
follows: OPENDEMONLY (CLODEMONLY)=1 after democratization for open (closed) countries that democratized; DEMOPENONLY (AUTOPENONLY)=1 after 
liberalization for democratic (autocratic) countries that only liberalized; DEM2LESS (OPEN2LESS)=1 after democratization (liberalization) for countries that democratized 
(liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within 5 years; DEMOPENLESS (OPENDEMLESS)=1 after liberalization (democratization) for countries that 
democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within 5 years; DEM2MORE (OPEN2MORE)=1 after democratization (liberalization) for countries that 
democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within more than 5 years; DEMOPENMORE (OPENDEMORE)=1 after liberalization (democratization) 
for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within more than 5 years.    33 
 Table 5: Effects of Rapid Economic and Political Liberalizations on Corruption, Using Freedom House Index to Construct 
Democratization Dummies 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
OPENONLY  0.122  0.122  0.122  0.107  0.107  0.107  0.207**  0.207  0.207* 
  (0.086)  (0.186)  (0.115)  (0.090)  (0.185)  (0.124)  (0.090)  (0.193)  (0.122) 
DEMONLY  -0.066  -0.066  -0.066  -0.091  -0.091  -0.091  0.182*  0.182  0.182* 
  (0.117)  (0.247)  (0.118)  (0.120)  (0.278)  (0.127)  (0.101)  (0.214)  (0.100) 
DEM2LESS  -0.177**  -0.177  -0.177**  -0.344***  -0.344*  -0.344***  -0.119  -0.119  -0.119 
  (0.080)  (0.163)  (0.083)  (0.087)  (0.182)  (0.091)  (0.082)  (0.155)  (0.080) 
OPEN2LESS  -0.281*  -0.281  -0.281*  -0.335**  -0.335  -0.335**  -0.283*  -0.283  -0.283* 
  (0.168)  (0.311)  (0.165)  (0.149)  (0.259)  (0.136)  (0.168)  (0.312)  (0.159) 
DEMOPENLESS  -0.142**  -0.142  -0.142*  -0.092  -0.092  -0.092  -0.133*  -0.133  -0.133 
  (0.071)  (0.134)  (0.078)  (0.088)  (0.193)  (0.083)  (0.074)  (0.148)  (0.081) 
OPENDEMLESS  -0.860***  -0.860  -0.860***  -0.748***  -0.748  -0.748***  -0.759***  -0.759  -0.759*** 
  (0.205)  (0.577)  (0.205)  (0.187)  (0.506)  (0.184)  (0.206)  (0.582)  (0.198) 
DEM2MORE  -0.211*  -0.211  -0.211*  -0.471***  -0.471*  -0.471***  -0.245*  -0.245  -0.245** 
  (0.126)  (0.211)  (0.115)  (0.141)  (0.242)  (0.145)  (0.129)  (0.217)  (0.117) 
OPEN2MORE  0.435**  0.435  0.435**  0.355**  0.355  0.355***  0.470**  0.470  0.470** 
  (0.221)  (0.322)  (0.193)  (0.143)  (0.258)  (0.124)  (0.219)  (0.323)  (0.183) 
DEMOPENMORE  -0.476***  -0.476**  -0.476***  -0.137  -0.137  -0.137  -0.408***  -0.408**  -0.408*** 
  (0.090)  (0.187)  (0.100)  (0.107)  (0.267)  (0.117)  (0.088)  (0.180)  (0.097) 
OPENDEMORE  1.027***  1.027*  1.027***  0.960***  0.960  0.960***  0.964***  0.964  0.964*** 
  (0.318)  (0.619)  (0.305)  (0.308)  (0.622)  (0.295)  (0.311)  (0.608)  (0.295) 
Sample  All  All  All  All  All  All  No High Inc  No High Inc  No High Inc 
Regional Dummies?  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Observations  1992  1992  1992  1992  1992  1992  1492  1492  1492 
Adj. R-Squared  0.7982  0.7982  0.7982  0.8126  0.8126  0.8126  0.6401  0.6401  0.6401 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. In columns 2, 5 and 8, standard errors are also clustered by country; in columns 3, 6 and 9, standard errors are 
clustered by region-year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and time fixed effects, as well as a socialist origin 
dummy interacted with each of the reforms (openness and democratization). Regional dummies refer to the interaction between the year fixed effects and dummy variables for 
Asia, Africa, Latin America, and socialist legal origin. No High Inc refers to sample excluding high income countries (per OECD definition). Reform dummies are defined as 
follows: DEMONLY (OPENONLY)=1 after democratization (liberalization) for countries that only democratized (liberalized); DEM2LESS (OPEN2LESS)=1 after 
democratization (liberalization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within 5 years; DEMOPENLESS 
(OPENDEMLESS)=1 after liberalization (democratization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within 5 years; 
DEM2MORE (OPEN2MORE)=1 after democratization (liberalization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within more 
than 5 years; DEMOPENMORE (OPENDEMORE)=1 after liberalization (democratization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) 
second and within more than 5 years.  
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Table 6: Effects of Rapid Economic and Political Liberalizations on Corruption, Distinguishing How Country Starts Out, and 
Using Freedom House Index to Construct Democratization Dummies 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
CLODEMONLY  0.006  0.006  0.006  -0.255*  -0.255  -0.255*  0.079  0.079  0.079 
  (0.139)  (0.248)  (0.142)  (0.146)  (0.315)  (0.142)  (0.137)  (0.275)  (0.142) 
AUTOPENONLY  0.121  0.121  0.121  0.108  0.108  0.108  0.210**  0.210  0.210* 
  (0.086)  (0.186)  (0.116)  (0.090)  (0.186)  (0.124)  (0.090)  (0.193)  (0.123) 
OPENDEMONLY  -0.122  -0.122  -0.122  0.036  0.036  0.036  0.273*  0.273  0.273* 
  (0.178)  (0.394)  (0.173)  (0.178)  (0.403)  (0.175)  (0.149)  (0.315)  (0.155) 
DEMOPENONLY  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000  0.000 
  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
DEM2LESS  -0.178**  -0.178  -0.178**  -0.345***  -0.345*  -0.345***  -0.119  -0.119  -0.119 
  (0.080)  (0.163)  (0.083)  (0.087)  (0.182)  (0.091)  (0.082)  (0.155)  (0.080) 
OPEN2LESS  -0.280*  -0.280  -0.280*  -0.337**  -0.337  -0.337**  -0.284*  -0.284  -0.284* 
  (0.168)  (0.311)  (0.164)  (0.149)  (0.261)  (0.137)  (0.169)  (0.313)  (0.160) 
DEMOPENLESS  -0.144**  -0.144  -0.144*  -0.086  -0.086  -0.086  -0.129*  -0.129  -0.129 
  (0.071)  (0.135)  (0.079)  (0.088)  (0.195)  (0.085)  (0.074)  (0.149)  (0.081) 
OPENDEMLESS  -0.863***  -0.863  -0.863***  -0.742***  -0.742  -0.742***  -0.754***  -0.754  -0.754*** 
  (0.205)  (0.578)  (0.205)  (0.187)  (0.506)  (0.184)  (0.207)  (0.583)  (0.199) 
DEM2MORE  -0.211*  -0.211  -0.211*  -0.475***  -0.475*  -0.475***  -0.246*  -0.246  -0.246** 
  (0.126)  (0.211)  (0.115)  (0.141)  (0.243)  (0.145)  (0.129)  (0.217)  (0.117) 
OPEN2MORE  0.434**  0.434  0.434**  0.356**  0.356  0.356***  0.471**  0.471  0.471** 
  (0.221)  (0.322)  (0.193)  (0.143)  (0.258)  (0.123)  (0.219)  (0.323)  (0.182) 
DEMOPENMORE  -0.477***  -0.477**  -0.477***  -0.133  -0.133  -0.133  -0.407***  -0.407**  -0.407*** 
  (0.090)  (0.187)  (0.100)  (0.107)  (0.268)  (0.117)  (0.088)  (0.181)  (0.097) 
OPENDEMORE  1.026***  1.026  1.026***  0.958***  0.958  0.958***  0.965***  0.965  0.965*** 
  (0.318)  (0.619)  (0.306)  (0.308)  (0.624)  (0.295)  (0.311)  (0.609)  (0.295) 
Sample  All  All  All  All  All  All  No High Inc  No High Inc  No High Inc 
Regional dummies?  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Observations  1992  1992  1992  1992  1992  1992  1492  1492  1492 
Adj. R-Squared  0.7982  0.7982  0.7982  0.8127  0.8127  0.8127  0.6400  0.6400  0.6400 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. In columns 2, 5 and 8, standard errors are also clustered by country; in columns 3, 6 and 9, standard errors are 
clustered by region-year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and time fixed effects, as well as a socialist origin 
dummy interacted with each of the reforms (openness and democratization). Regional dummies refer to the interaction between the year fixed effects and dummy variables for 
Asia, Africa, Latin America, and socialist legal origin. No High Inc refers to sample excluding high income countries (per OECD definition).  Reform dummies are defined as 
follows: OPENDEMONLY (CLODEMONLY)=1 after democratization for open (closed) countries that democratized; DEMOPENONLY (AUTOPENONLY)=1 after 
liberalization for democratic (autocratic) countries that only liberalized; DEM2LESS (OPEN2LESS)=1 after democratization (liberalization) for countries that democratized 
(liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within 5 years; DEMOPENLESS (OPENDEMLESS)=1 after liberalization (democratization) for countries that 
democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within 5 years; DEM2MORE (OPEN2MORE)=1 after democratization (liberalization) for countries that 
democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within more than 5 years; DEMOPENMORE (OPENDEMORE)=1 after liberalization (democratization) 
for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within more than 5 years.    35 
 Table 7: Effects of Rapid Economic and Political Liberalizations on Corruption, Using Other Controls 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
SIZE OF GOVERNMENT  -2.016***  -2.016**  -2.016***  -1.433**  -1.433  -1.433**  -0.146  -0.146  -0.146 
  (0.573)  (0.875)  (0.612)  (0.600)  (0.935)  (0.647)  (0.625)  (0.948)  (0.707) 
LITERACY  -0.017  -0.017  -0.017  -0.067***  -0.067*  -0.067***  -0.041**  -0.041  -0.041** 
  (0.015)  (0.033)  (0.013)  (0.017)  (0.037)  (0.015)  (0.017)  (0.037)  (0.016) 
LOG OF POPULATION  0.031  0.031  0.031  1.332*  1.332  1.332**  -0.494  -0.494  -0.494 
  (0.645)  (1.467)  (0.560)  (0.734)  (1.798)  (0.534)  (0.727)  (1.551)  (0.548) 
OPENONLY  0.194*  0.194  0.194*  0.147  0.147  0.147  0.190**  0.190  0.190* 
  (0.099)  (0.222)  (0.100)  (0.095)  (0.186)  (0.096)  (0.095)  (0.189)  (0.100) 
DEMONLY  -0.280**  -0.280  -0.280**  -0.120  -0.120  -0.120  -0.055  -0.055  -0.055 
  (0.131)  (0.300)  (0.128)  (0.130)  (0.312)  (0.128)  (0.133)  (0.306)  (0.133) 
DEM2LESS  0.080  0.080  0.080  -0.161  -0.161  -0.161  -0.223  -0.223  -0.223 
  (0.139)  (0.247)  (0.141)  (0.164)  (0.244)  (0.167)  (0.166)  (0.260)  (0.154) 
OPEN2LESS  -0.179  -0.179  -0.179  -0.179  -0.179  -0.179  -0.218  -0.218  -0.218 
  (0.154)  (0.220)  (0.177)  (0.194)  (0.153)  (0.230)  (0.190)  (0.150)  (0.228) 
DEMOPENLESS  -0.354**  -0.354  -0.354**  -0.353**  -0.353  -0.353*  -0.251  -0.251  -0.251 
  (0.153)  (0.328)  (0.171)  (0.175)  (0.382)  (0.203)  (0.164)  (0.342)  (0.188) 
OPENDEMLESS  -0.317**  -0.317  -0.317*  -0.301*  -0.301  -0.301  -0.210  -0.210  -0.210 
  (0.147)  (0.384)  (0.174)  (0.179)  (0.584)  (0.235)  (0.173)  (0.564)  (0.233) 
DEM2MORE  -0.399**  -0.399  -0.399*  -0.614***  -0.614**  -0.614***  -0.585***  -0.585**  -0.585*** 
  (0.192)  (0.253)  (0.204)  (0.206)  (0.268)  (0.223)  (0.185)  (0.243)  (0.196) 
OPEN2MORE  -0.430  -0.430  -0.430  -0.444*  -0.444  -0.444*  -0.448*  -0.448  -0.448* 
  (0.272)  (0.278)  (0.262)  (0.261)  (0.269)  (0.249)  (0.270)  (0.276)  (0.255) 
DEMOPENMORE  -0.042  -0.042  -0.042  0.180  0.180  0.180  -0.105  -0.105  -0.105 
  (0.155)  (0.192)  (0.191)  (0.184)  (0.242)  (0.236)  (0.195)  (0.253)  (0.253) 
OPENDEMORE  0.954***  0.954*  0.954***  0.770**  0.770  0.770**  0.732**  0.732  0.732* 
  (0.248)  (0.514)  (0.284)  (0.340)  (0.686)  (0.365)  (0.342)  (0.679)  (0.370) 
Sample  All  All  All  All  All  All  No High Inc  No High Inc  No High Inc 
Regional Dummies?  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Observations  945  945  945  945  945  945  821  821  821 
Adj. R-Squared  0.7043  0.7043  0.7043  0.7372  0.7372  0.7372  0.7261  0.7261  0.7261 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. In columns 2, 5 and 8, standard errors are also clustered by country; in columns 3, 6 and 9, standard errors are 
clustered by region-year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and time fixed effects, as well as a socialist origin 
dummy interacted with each of the reforms (openness and democratization). Regional dummies refer to the interaction between the year fixed effects and dummy variables for 
Asia, Africa, Latin America, and socialist legal origin. No High Inc refers to sample excluding high income countries (per OECD definition). Reform dummies are defined as 
follows: DEMONLY (OPENONLY)=1 after democratization (liberalization) for countries that only democratized (liberalized); DEM2LESS (OPEN2LESS)=1 after 
democratization (liberalization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within 5 years; DEMOPENLESS 
(OPENDEMLESS)=1 after liberalization (democratization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within 5 years; 
DEM2MORE (OPEN2MORE)=1 after democratization (liberalization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within more 
than 5 years; DEMOPENMORE (OPENDEMORE)=1 after liberalization (democratization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) 
second and within more than 5 years. Size of Government is general government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP, taken from the IMF’s Financial Statistics. 
Literacy is the literacy rate for adults (ages 15 and above), from the World Development Indicators. Log of Population is from the World Development Indicators.   36 
Table 8: Effects of Rapid Economic and Political Liberalizations on Corruption, Using Other Controls and Distinguishing 
How Country Starts Out 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
SIZE OF GOVERNMENT  -1.982***  -1.982**  -1.982***  -1.406**  -1.406  -1.406**  -0.203  -0.203  -0.203 
  (0.574)  (0.873)  (0.620)  (0.605)  (0.947)  (0.650)  (0.634)  (0.896)  (0.654) 
LITERACY  -0.013  -0.013  -0.013  -0.056***  -0.056  -0.056***  0.011  0.011  0.011 
  (0.017)  (0.037)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.039)  (0.017)  (0.015)  (0.031)  (0.015) 
LOG OF POPULATION  0.009  0.009  0.009  1.451**  1.451  1.451***  0.276  0.276  0.276 
  (0.658)  (1.486)  (0.568)  (0.731)  (1.818)  (0.538)  (0.680)  (1.498)  (0.563) 
CLODEMONLY  -0.631***  -0.631**  -0.631***  -0.429**  -0.429  -0.429**  -0.540***  -0.540**  -0.540*** 
  (0.187)  (0.287)  (0.185)  (0.173)  (0.272)  (0.174)  (0.182)  (0.264)  (0.183) 
AUTOPENONLY  0.313*  0.313  0.313  0.116  0.116  0.116  0.383**  0.383  0.383** 
  (0.166)  (0.332)  (0.190)  (0.161)  (0.326)  (0.178)  (0.169)  (0.352)  (0.189) 
OPENDEMONLY  0.202  0.202  0.202  0.314**  0.314  0.314*  0.509***  0.509*  0.509*** 
  (0.142)  (0.323)  (0.127)  (0.160)  (0.427)  (0.172)  (0.150)  (0.293)  (0.162) 
DEMOPENONLY  0.119  0.119  0.119  0.187  0.187  0.187*  0.320***  0.320  0.320** 
  (0.118)  (0.262)  (0.116)  (0.114)  (0.225)  (0.111)  (0.122)  (0.251)  (0.123) 
DEM2LESS  0.083  0.083  0.083  -0.160  -0.160  -0.160  0.096  0.096  0.096 
  (0.139)  (0.248)  (0.141)  (0.165)  (0.247)  (0.169)  (0.149)  (0.282)  (0.145) 
OPEN2LESS  -0.175  -0.175  -0.175  -0.175  -0.175  -0.175  -0.197  -0.197  -0.197 
  (0.154)  (0.221)  (0.176)  (0.193)  (0.154)  (0.231)  (0.164)  (0.243)  (0.193) 
DEMOPENLESS  -0.342**  -0.342  -0.342**  -0.312*  -0.312  -0.312  -0.190  -0.190  -0.190 
  (0.153)  (0.328)  (0.169)  (0.178)  (0.385)  (0.199)  (0.164)  (0.335)  (0.171) 
OPENDEMLESS  -0.309**  -0.309  -0.309*  -0.274  -0.274  -0.274  -0.075  -0.075  -0.075 
  (0.148)  (0.384)  (0.171)  (0.178)  (0.580)  (0.233)  (0.152)  (0.395)  (0.192) 
DEM2MORE  -0.396**  -0.396  -0.396*  -0.603***  -0.603**  -0.603**  -0.367*  -0.367  -0.367* 
  (0.192)  (0.254)  (0.204)  (0.212)  (0.277)  (0.229)  (0.198)  (0.273)  (0.210) 
OPEN2MORE  -0.426  -0.426  -0.426  -0.436*  -0.436  -0.436*  -0.462  -0.462*  -0.462* 
  (0.274)  (0.278)  (0.261)  (0.264)  (0.276)  (0.251)  (0.292)  (0.272)  (0.276) 
DEMOPENMORE  -0.049  -0.049  -0.049  0.170  0.170  0.170  0.093  0.093  0.093 
  (0.155)  (0.190)  (0.191)  (0.184)  (0.240)  (0.237)  (0.170)  (0.218)  (0.212) 
OPENDEMORE  0.955***  0.955*  0.955***  0.757**  0.757  0.757**  0.841***  0.841  0.841*** 
  (0.248)  (0.514)  (0.284)  (0.340)  (0.685)  (0.367)  (0.247)  (0.522)  (0.290) 
Sample  All  All  All  All  All  All  No High Inc  No High Inc  No High Inc 
Regional Dummies?  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Observations  945  945  945  945  945  945  821  821  821 
Adj. R-Squared  0.7069  0.7069  0.7069  0.7387  0.7387  0.7387  0.6965  0.6965  0.6965 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. In columns 2, 5 and 8, standard errors are also clustered by country; in columns 3, 6 and 9, standard errors are clustered by region-year. * significant at 10%; 
** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and time fixed effects, as well as a socialist origin dummy interacted with each of the reforms (openness and democratization). Regional dummies 
refer to the interaction between the year fixed effects and dummy variables for Asia, Africa, Latin America, and socialist legal origin. No High Inc refers to sample excluding high income countries (per OECD definition).  
Reform dummies are defined as follows: OPENDEMONLY (CLODEMONLY)=1 after democratization for open (closed) countries that democratized; DEMOPENONLY (AUTOPENONLY)=1 after liberalization for 
democratic (autocratic) countries that only liberalized; DEM2LESS (OPEN2LESS)=1 after democratization (liberalization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within 5 
years; DEMOPENLESS (OPENDEMLESS)=1 after liberalization (democratization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within 5 years; DEM2MORE 
(OPEN2MORE)=1 after democratization (liberalization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within more than 5 years; DEMOPENMORE (OPENDEMORE)=1 after 
liberalization (democratization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within more than 5 years. Size of Government is general government final consumption expenditure 
as a percentage of GDP, taken from the IMF’s Financial Statistics. Literacy is the literacy rate for adults (ages 15 and above), from the World Development Indicators. Log of Population is from the World Development 
Indicators.   37 
Table 9: Effects of Rapid Economic and Political Liberalizations on Corruption, Using Other Controls and Freedom House 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
SIZE OF GOVERNMENT  -1.816***  -1.816*  -1.816***  -1.466**  -1.466  -1.466**  -0.217  -0.217  -0.217 
  (0.580)  (0.917)  (0.647)  (0.621)  (1.017)  (0.705)  (0.645)  (1.046)  (0.769) 
LITERACY  -0.010  -0.010  -0.010  -0.071***  -0.071*  -0.071***  -0.048***  -0.048  -0.048** 
  (0.016)  (0.037)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.037)  (0.018)  (0.018)  (0.037)  (0.019) 
LOG OF POPULATON  0.520  0.520  0.520  1.120  1.120  1.120**  -0.428  -0.428  -0.428 
  (0.655)  (1.552)  (0.532)  (0.692)  (1.679)  (0.515)  (0.674)  (1.490)  (0.530) 
OPENONLY  0.057  0.057  0.057  -0.058  -0.058  -0.058  -0.042  -0.042  -0.042 
  (0.123)  (0.238)  (0.134)  (0.121)  (0.210)  (0.133)  (0.120)  (0.210)  (0.135) 
DEMONLY  -0.140  -0.140  -0.140  -0.264**  -0.264  -0.264**  -0.204  -0.204  -0.204 
  (0.129)  (0.210)  (0.111)  (0.132)  (0.221)  (0.128)  (0.151)  (0.271)  (0.153) 
DEM2LESS  -0.168*  -0.168  -0.168*  -0.236**  -0.236  -0.236**  -0.263**  -0.263  -0.263** 
  (0.099)  (0.199)  (0.096)  (0.113)  (0.223)  (0.113)  (0.114)  (0.191)  (0.122) 
OPEN2LESS  -0.115  -0.115  -0.115  -0.081  -0.081  -0.081  -0.089  -0.089  -0.089 
  (0.201)  (0.318)  (0.152)  (0.186)  (0.228)  (0.133)  (0.184)  (0.229)  (0.135) 
DEMOPENLESS  0.052  0.052  0.052  -0.110  -0.110  -0.110  0.016  0.016  0.016 
  (0.104)  (0.141)  (0.114)  (0.116)  (0.188)  (0.133)  (0.110)  (0.155)  (0.112) 
OPENDEMLESS  -0.166  -0.166  -0.166  -0.623***  -0.623  -0.623***  -0.535***  -0.535  -0.535*** 
  (0.260)  (0.723)  (0.216)  (0.194)  (0.506)  (0.176)  (0.198)  (0.518)  (0.194) 
DEM2MORE  -0.429***  -0.429**  -0.429***  -0.462***  -0.462*  -0.462***  -0.541***  -0.541**  -0.541*** 
  (0.120)  (0.196)  (0.097)  (0.141)  (0.237)  (0.158)  (0.145)  (0.238)  (0.159) 
OPEN2MORE  0.539**  0.539  0.539***  0.416***  0.416  0.416***  0.463***  0.463*  0.463*** 
  (0.210)  (0.385)  (0.168)  (0.155)  (0.251)  (0.123)  (0.156)  (0.260)  (0.129) 
DEMOPENMORE  -0.343***  -0.343*  -0.343***  -0.049  -0.049  -0.049  -0.285*  -0.285  -0.285 
  (0.121)  (0.203)  (0.120)  (0.148)  (0.301)  (0.167)  (0.153)  (0.273)  (0.180) 
OPENDEMORE  0.563*  0.563  0.563*  0.881**  0.881  0.881***  0.882**  0.882  0.882*** 
  (0.340)  (0.811)  (0.292)  (0.362)  (0.725)  (0.326)  (0.353)  (0.753)  (0.326) 
Sample  All  All  All  All  All  All  No High Inc  No High Inc  No High Inc 
Regional Dummies?  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Observations  954  954  954  954  954  954  817  817  817 
Adj. R-Squared  0.7045  0.7045  0.7045  0.7414  0.7414  0.7414  0.7322  0.7322  0.7322 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. In columns 2, 5 and 8, standard errors are also clustered by country; in columns 3, 6 and 9, standard errors are 
clustered by region-year. * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and time fixed effects, as well as a socialist origin 
dummy interacted with each of the reforms (openness and democratization). Regional dummies refer to the interaction between the year fixed effects and dummy variables for 
Asia, Africa, Latin America, and socialist legal origin. No High Inc refers to sample excluding high income countries (per OECD definition). Reform dummies are defined as 
follows: DEMONLY (OPENONLY)=1 after democratization (liberalization) for countries that only democratized (liberalized); DEM2LESS (OPEN2LESS)=1 after 
democratization (liberalization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within 5 years; DEMOPENLESS 
(OPENDEMLESS)=1 after liberalization (democratization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within 5 years; 
DEM2MORE (OPEN2MORE)=1 after democratization (liberalization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within more 
than 5 years; DEMOPENMORE (OPENDEMORE)=1 after liberalization (democratization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) 
second and within more than 5 years. Size of Government is general government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP, taken from the IMF’s Financial Statistics. 
Literacy is the literacy rate for adults (ages 15 and above), from the World Development Indicators. Log of Population is from the World Development Indicators.   38 
Table 10: Effects of Rapid Economic and Political Liberalizations on Corruption, Using Other Controls and Freedom House, 
and Distinguishing How Country Starts Out 
  (1)  (2)  (3)  (4)  (5)  (6)  (7)  (8)  (9) 
SIZE OF GOVERNMENT  -1.775***  -1.775*  -1.775***  -1.431**  -1.431  -1.431**  -0.199  -0.199  -0.199 
  (0.581)  (0.921)  (0.655)  (0.621)  (1.019)  (0.711)  (0.638)  (0.966)  (0.703) 
LITERACY  -0.008  -0.008  -0.008  -0.069***  -0.069*  -0.069***  0.012  0.012  0.012 
  (0.016)  (0.037)  (0.015)  (0.018)  (0.037)  (0.018)  (0.015)  (0.034)  (0.015) 
LOG OF POPULATION  0.504  0.504  0.504  1.219*  1.219  1.219**  0.521  0.521  0.521 
  (0.656)  (1.558)  (0.530)  (0.690)  (1.681)  (0.515)  (0.667)  (1.578)  (0.578) 
CLODEMONLY  -0.468***  -0.468***  -0.468***  -0.589***  -0.589***  -0.589***  -0.556***  -0.556***  -0.556*** 
  (0.171)  (0.081)  (0.163)  (0.165)  (0.206)  (0.154)  (0.197)  (0.111)  (0.189) 
AUTOPENONLY  0.063  0.063  0.063  -0.047  -0.047  -0.047  0.163  0.163  0.163 
  (0.123)  (0.238)  (0.134)  (0.121)  (0.210)  (0.134)  (0.126)  (0.242)  (0.142) 
OPENDEMONLY  0.100  0.100  0.100  -0.028  -0.028  -0.028  0.317*  0.317*  0.317 
  (0.169)  (0.218)  (0.158)  (0.179)  (0.177)  (0.187)  (0.186)  (0.166)  (0.200) 
DEM2LESS  -0.172*  -0.172  -0.172*  -0.243**  -0.243  -0.243**  0.059  0.059  0.059 
  (0.099)  (0.200)  (0.097)  (0.113)  (0.224)  (0.114)  (0.101)  (0.194)  (0.098) 
OPEN2LESS  -0.107  -0.107  -0.107  -0.071  -0.071  -0.071  -0.077  -0.077  -0.077 
  (0.201)  (0.319)  (0.152)  (0.187)  (0.230)  (0.133)  (0.202)  (0.344)  (0.155) 
DEMOPENLESS  0.063  0.063  0.063  -0.092  -0.092  -0.092  0.110  0.110  0.110 
  (0.104)  (0.143)  (0.114)  (0.117)  (0.191)  (0.134)  (0.111)  (0.168)  (0.122) 
OPENDEMLESS  -0.154  -0.154  -0.154  -0.604***  -0.604  -0.604***  -0.018  -0.018  -0.018 
  (0.260)  (0.724)  (0.217)  (0.195)  (0.508)  (0.178)  (0.271)  (0.748)  (0.247) 
DEM2MORE  -0.439***  -0.439**  -0.439***  -0.477***  -0.477*  -0.477***  -0.343**  -0.343  -0.343*** 
  (0.120)  (0.198)  (0.099)  (0.142)  (0.240)  (0.160)  (0.137)  (0.252)  (0.116) 
OPEN2MORE  0.545***  0.545  0.545***  0.425***  0.425*  0.425***  0.598***  0.598  0.598*** 
  (0.211)  (0.387)  (0.168)  (0.156)  (0.251)  (0.123)  (0.215)  (0.404)  (0.181) 
DEMOPENMORE  -0.344***  -0.344*  -0.344***  -0.049  -0.049  -0.049  -0.076  -0.076  -0.076 
  (0.121)  (0.203)  (0.120)  (0.148)  (0.303)  (0.168)  (0.137)  (0.273)  (0.143) 
OPENDEMORE  0.555  0.555  0.555*  0.866**  0.866  0.866***  0.512  0.512  0.512 
  (0.341)  (0.812)  (0.293)  (0.362)  (0.726)  (0.327)  (0.352)  (0.841)  (0.313) 
Sample  All  All  All  All  All  All  No High Inc  No High Inc  No High Inc 
Regional Dummies?  No  No  No  Yes  Yes  Yes  No  No  No 
Observations  954  954  954  954  954  954  817  817  817 
Adj. R-Squared  0.7051  0.7051  0.7051  0.7420  0.7420  0.7420  0.6873  0.6873  0.6873 
Note: Heteroskedastic-consistent standard errors are in parenthesis. In columns 2, 5 and 8, standard errors are also clustered by country; in columns 3, 6 and 9, standard errors are clustered by region-year. * 
significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%. All regressions include country and time fixed effects, as well as a socialist origin dummy interacted with each of the reforms (openness and 
democratization). Regional dummies refer to the interaction between the year fixed effects and dummy variables for Asia, Africa, Latin America, and socialist legal origin. No High Inc refers to sample 
excluding high income countries (per OECD definition).  Reform dummies are defined as follows: OPENDEMONLY (CLODEMONLY)=1 after democratization for open (closed) countries that democratized; 
DEMOPENONLY (AUTOPENONLY)=1 after liberalization for democratic (autocratic) countries that only liberalized; DEM2LESS (OPEN2LESS)=1 after democratization (liberalization) for countries that 
democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within 5 years; DEMOPENLESS (OPENDEMLESS)=1 after liberalization (democratization) for countries that democratized 
(liberalized) first and liberalized (democratized) second and within 5 years; DEM2MORE (OPEN2MORE)=1 after democratization (liberalization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and 
liberalized (democratized) second and within more than 5 years; DEMOPENMORE (OPENDEMORE)=1 after liberalization (democratization) for countries that democratized (liberalized) first and liberalized 
(democratized) second and within more than 5 years. Size of Government is general government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP, taken from the IMF’s Financial Statistics. Literacy is the 
literacy rate for adults (ages 15 and above), from the World Development Indicators. Log of Population is from the World Development Indicators.  
 
Notes: A lower corruption index means lower perceived corruption. Dates of political liberalization are as follows: Argentina 
(1983), Brazil (1985), Hungary (1989), Poland (1989). Dates of economic liberalization are: Argentina (1991), Brazil (1991), 
Hungary (1990), Poland (1990) 
 
 
 